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The Supreme Court has taken an appeal of Fulton Shipping Inc of Panama v 
Globalia Business Travel S.A.U. (The New Flamenco)
1
 which is scheduled for argument 
in late November.  The claim was for damages following the anticipatory repudiation of a 
time charter. Ostensibly, the case concerns whether the claimant’s subsequent sale of the 
vessel should be viewed as having mitigated the damages.  This struck me as odd, so I 
read both the High Court and Court of Appeals decisions to see if they could shed some 
light. To explain the mitigation doctrine, both decisions harkened back to the classic 
statement, British Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground 
Electric Railways Co of London Ltd (No.2).
2
 So, I went back to that, thinking that might 
help. It did, but not in the way I had initially expected. It turns out that, properly 
understood, neither British Westinghouse nor Fulton Shipping involves mitigation at all. 
 
That was a bit of a surprise. British Westinghouse was, after all, an oft-cited 
century-old precedent that appeared to be beyond controversy.
3
 However, Andrew 
Dyson, in a nice piece of legal archeology, has provided new information that 
undermines the mitigation claim.
4
 To be sure, Professor Dyson and I disagree on how to 
interpret this, as he still couches his analysis in mitigation language.  
 
Mitigation is an element of contract damages, but its role should not be 
exaggerated. Take one example. If the seller were to breach a contract to purchase a 
fungible commodity in a competitive market, the damages would be the contract/market 
differential. This could be put in mitigation language—the buyer mitigated by buying 
from someone else; even if it hadn’t, the buyer could have bought from someone else but 
chose not to, so we will treat him as if he had. Dyson (and his coauthor) put it this way: 
“Mitigation is often said to comprise three rules,
 
but it is better expressed using just one: 





An alternative way of framing the matter is to view the buyer’s purchase from 
another seller as evidence of the market price. If it purchased an identical item on the 
same date, it would be extremely good evidence; the more imperfect the substitute and 
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 2 
the longer the period of time between the breach date and the cover date, the poorer the 
evidence. But what if the buyer chose not to cover? Would this require an inquiry into the 
reasonableness of the refusal? Should the purchase be imputed? Would it make any 
difference if the buyer chose not to cover because (a) it was speculating that it might get a 
better price in the future, (b) it no longer wanted the commodity and was grateful that it 
had been spared, or (c) given the new higher price, it no longer found the purchase 
attractive? Should any of these preclude recovery? The mitigation language gets in the 
way. The problem arises in the case law when the courts ask if there is an “available 
market.”
6
 It was, as we will see, a significant cause of the confusion in The New 
Flamenco. 
 
In cases involving direct damages—the change in the value of the contract when 
one party breaches—the mitigation language is, at best, unhelpful. Consider an example 
at the opposite extreme of the fungible commodity sale of the previous two paragraphs: 
repudiation by a buyer in the third year of a twenty-year take-or-pay contract; is anything 
to be gained by asking what would constitute mitigation? Is the question even coherent?
7
 
The New Flamenco is a direct damages case and, as I will show in Section II, the attempt 
to stuff it into the mitigation box led the Court of Appeal astray. The claim in British 
Westinghouse, however, was not for direct damages, but rather for consequential 
damages. There, the notion that the extent of the damages can be controlled by the pre- or 
post-breach behavior of the claimant carries more weight. Nonetheless, given the facts, 
mitigation was almost completely irrelevant in British Westinghouse. I use the “almost” 
qualifier to isolate a possible mitigation story quite different from the one presented in the 
actual case. 
 
I. British Westinghouse 
 
British Westinghouse (hereafter BW) provided eight steam turbines and 
alternators for the Chelsea power station for what are now the Circle and District lines. 
The total cost was £250,000 to be paid in installments. Although the turbines fell short of 
the promised specifications, Underground (hereafter UER) accepted them, reserving the 
right to sue for damages. Excess annual coal purchases to power the turbines were around 
£10,000. After Westinghouse failed to bring the machines up to specifications, UER 
replaced the turbines by those made by a competitor, Parsons. The new machines were 
installed roughly five years after the BW machines had begun performance. The cost of 
the Parsons machines was £78,186.
8
 UER’s Chief Engineer estimated an annual saving of 
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After the turbines had been replaced UER ceased payment and BW sued for the 
unpaid balance, £85,398. UER counterclaimed for over £40,000 for the additional costs 
(mainly for extra coal) it had already incurred. In addition, it argued that it would have 
suffered £237,728 of additional costs for the remaining life of the turbines. Alternatively, 
it argued that it had mitigated the damages by installing the Parsons turbines and so 
should be credited with the £78,226 it had spent to mitigate the damages (the £237,728) 
that would have occurred had it not replaced the turbines. 
 
The arbitrator found that UER would have replaced the BW turbines with the 
Parsons machines even if the BW machines had been as specified: 
 
I further find that the purchase of the Parsons machines was to the 
pecuniary advantage of the respondents, and that the superiority of the 
Parsons machines in efficiency and economy over those supplied by the 
claimants is so great that even if the claimants had delivered to the 
respondents machines in all respects complying with the conditions of the 
contract it would have been to the pecuniary advantage of the respondents 





By purchasing the Parsons machines, the arbitrator held, the future damages from 
running the BW turbines for the remaining life of the turbines were avoided. The claim it 
would have had against BW was thereby mitigated. Who should bear responsibility for 
the £78,226? BW, said the arbitrator. He held that had UER not installed the Parsons 
machines, BW would have suffered much greater damages—the £237,728 of future coal 
costs. By installing the Parsons machines it had mitigated the damages to which it would 
have otherwise been entitled. The High Court and Court of Appeals concurred; however, 
the House of Lords reversed.  
 
BW argued that “the arbitrator was entitled to draw the inference that the 
‘commercial life’ of the claimant’s machines had expired at the date of the purchase by 
the respondents of the Parsons machines.”
11
 “The life of the Westinghouse machines was 
from that time as much at an end as if they had been worn out in ordinary work. They 
were thenceforward valueless, and a prudent board would have at once consigned them to 
the scrap heap.”
12
 UER argued that was irrelevant, because “the measure of the damages 
was fixed at the date of the breach; and at that date it could not be foreseen what would 




UER continued: “No inference can be drawn that after the Parsons machines were 
invented the respondents would have bought them if the Westinghouse machines 
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 4 
supplied had been up to contract. Such contingencies are too remote to be entitled to 
consideration.”
14
 At the Court of Appeal Lord Alverstone rejected BW’s argument:  
 
You must first ascertain what would be the ordinary life of a properly 
constructed Westinghouse machine, that is to say the number of years 
during which a reasonable person would work it before finally consigning 
it to the scrap heap as worn out. And the measure of damages would be the 
loss which the purchaser would sustain from having to work a defective 
Westinghouse machine during all that period instead of one which was 
constructed in accordance with the contract. That it seems to me would 
prima facie be the measure of the damages, and the sum of money which 
would represent that loss we are told would be a very large sum indeed. 
*   *   * 
It is clear that the railway company are entitled to recover the cost of the 
substituted machines on the ground that by their action they saved the 
claimants from a very much larger claim for damages than is in fact being 
made against them. . . . If the putting in the Parsons machines had 
increased the damages the cost ought not to be recovered. It is because the 
substitution was in relief of the claimants, and for that reason alone, that 




In the House of Lords, the only opinion was given by Lord Chancellor Viscount 
Haldane. He reversed the decision, holding that UER should bear the costs of the Parsons 
machines. In the normal course of business, UER acted in such a way as to mitigate the 
damages.  
 
The transaction was . . . but one in which the person whose contract was 
broken took a reasonable and prudent course quite naturally arising out of 
the circumstances in which he was placed by the breach. Apart from the 
breach of contract, the lapse of time had rendered the appellants’ machines 
obsolete, and men of business would be doing the only thing they could 




He did not say what the result would have been had UER failed to install the Parsons 
turbines. Would it have been able to claim damages of over £200,000? Doubtful. The 




 Ibid 583-4. In High Court. Hamilton J. rejected the contention that “the moment it is ascertained as a 
matter of business prudence that the inferior machines must be superseded, the cost of the substitution of 
other machines which is consequent on the breach of contract cannot be legally attributed to the breach, but 
must be attributed entirely to the progress of science.” (587) He further asserted that the court was bound 
by the arbitrator’s finding: “The finding that the purchase of the Parsons machines was a mitigation of the 
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superior to that for which it has been substituted that it would have been worth the respondents’ while in 
any event to effect that substitution is in my opinion a matter which is wholly irrelevant to the present 
inquiry.” 586-7 
16
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 5 
court likely would have found that UER should have acted reasonably and damages 




Without explicitly saying so, Viscount Haldane adopted BW’s position that the 
commercial value of the BW turbines, even if they had met the specifications, was zero 
when they were replaced by the Parsons turbines. None of the opinions indicated why 
this might be so. Andrew Dyson explained: 
 
[O]ne must appreciate the rate at which steam turbine efficiency was 
advancing in the early 1900s. The pace of development may be likened to 
that of computer processors in the modern day. To think that London 
Underground could reasonably have continued working the defective 
Westinghouse turbines for twenty years, when the usual turnover of 
turbines due to obsolescence was in the region of five years, does not 
accord with common sense. Indeed, in 1913, just one year after the House 
of Lords’ handed down its decision in British Westinghouse, London 
Underground decided to replace its turbines again, despite that the Parsons 





The physical life of the turbines (supposedly 20 years) was irrelevant. What mattered was 
the expected commercial life of about five years.
19
   
 
The record on the timing of replacement is mixed. Dyson claims that “the 
defective state of the Westinghouse machines provided the initial trigger to replace 
them,” relying both on the way UER pled its case and records of meetings of the board of 
directors.
20
 On the other hand, Viscount Haldane characterized the arbitrator’s opinion 
thusly: “it would yet have been to the pecuniary advantage of the respondents [UER] at 
their own cost to have replaced the machines supplied by the appellants by Parsons 




Given the rapid pace of technological change, UER would have to decide when to 
replace the BW turbines. Suppose that if the BW turbines had met the specifications, they 
would have been replaced in five years. What would be the efficient replacement decision 
if the BW turbines fell short as in fact happened? If new turbines were installed a year 
earlier there would be some gains from incorporating the new technology earlier. These 
would be partially offset if the turbines installed in year four were not as good as the 
turbines that would have been installed in year five. The net effect would almost certainly 
be to replace earlier or, at worst, at the same time.
22
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How would the damage rule impact the replacement decision? If UER would be 
fully compensated for the additional costs actually incurred, in each period it would be 
receiving the same benefit as it would have, had there been no breach. Consequently, its 
replacement decision would be the same as it would have been had BW not breached. It 
would purchase and install the Parsons machines at the same time it would have had there 
been no breach. Ironically, compensation for the additional costs would result in delayed 
installation. The breach did not cause a purchase of the Parsons turbines.  The efficient 
response to the breach might have resulted in earlier installation than if there had been no 
breach, but the anticipated compensation for the additional costs would have reduced or 
eliminated the motive to accelerate the replacement.  
 
If the arbitrator’s findings are to be believed, the replacement was not 
premature—the Parsons turbines were installed when they would have been had the BW 
turbines functioned properly, at the end of the BW machines’ expected commercial life. 
What if, for some reason, UER had jumped the gun and installed the Parsons machines 
earlier than it otherwise would have? That would have had the effect of both reducing the 
damages measured by the additional costs and moving the replacement date toward a 
more efficient outcome. The cost of accelerating the replacement date would have had 
two elements. One would be the time value of money—UER would incur the 
replacement costs earlier. The other would arise if the earlier replacement meant that the 
turbines would not be quite as good as ones available on the market at the later 
replacement date.  It is plausible, though not inevitable, that this second component 
would be zero—there would not be enough time passed to alter the quality of the 
available machines.  
 
If the benefits of accelerated replacement exceeded the costs, the acceleration 
would mitigate the damages. The mitigation would not be the cost of the Parsons 
machines, the £78,226, but the much smaller costs of acceleration. Ascertaining the 
interest cost would not be difficult; determining whether the quality had been affected, 
and by how much, would be much more problematic. If somehow it could be done and 
UER’s compensation took it into account, UER would have had the proper incentive to 
replace the faulty machines in a timely fashion. Determining ex post what the optimal 
time for replacement should have been and whether UER’s decision had been reasonable 
would be extraordinarily difficult. However, it shouldn’t be necessary. Better to rely on 
BW’s ex ante incentives. If BW perceived that it could not resolve the problems with its 
turbines, it could have offered to pay UER to adopt the new technology earlier, if that 
were the efficient resolution.
23
 BW would, of course, still be liable for the excess costs 
that had been incurred. 
 
The framing of the replacement decision by the arbitrator and the courts led to 
confusion over the “betterment” issue, as exemplified by Buckley L.J.’s dissenting 
opinion in the Court of Appeals. The new machines were obviously better, but he wanted 
to know if machines of equal quality were available. “If the arbitrator had found that they 
had no alternative to purchase such more powerful, more efficient, and more long-lived 
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 7 
machines in order to mitigate the damages, the case would have been more easy. But I 
cannot find that he has found to that effect.”
24
 He argued that the arbitrator should have 
asked “whether it was the only reasonable and prudent course which they could take to 
mitigate the damages, or whether, for instance, they could have bought Parsons machines 
of 5500 kilowatts and of efficiency and length of life no greater than that of the discarded 
machines.”
25
 For him, mitigation ideally would entail replacement with machines that 
were only just as good as the properly functioning originals. Had he (and the others) not 
framed the matter in terms of mitigation, he would have recognized that it would make no 
sense to replace the machines with obsolete machines with a value of zero (or less) and 
that the expected commercial life of the original machines was only in the five-year 
range. 
 
Had UER leased the BW turbines for five years, there would have been no issue 
of mitigation.  At the end of the five years, the lease would have been up and the 
machines would be replaced by new ones. Damages would have been the additional costs 
incurred because the machines failed to meet the contract specifications and the 
replacement of the leased machines would have been irrelevant. In the actual case, UER 
bought machines with an expected life of about five years and when their effective 
commercial life had expired those machines were replaced. The damages, again, were the 
additional costs incurred. In either case, UER was going to replace the machines after 
about five years. In neither case does it make sense to refer to the anticipated replacement 
as mitigation. 
 
II. The New Flamenco 
 
The facts are straightforward. The charterer and owner of the New Flamenco, a 
small cruise ship, were negotiating an extension of the charter period and reached an oral 
agreement for a two-year extension. The charterer refused to sign and maintained that it 
could redeliver on the preexisting termination date. The owner disagreed, arguing that an 
agreement existed and the charterer had anticipatorily repudiated that agreement. On the 
liability question the arbitrator found in favor of the owner. The problem arose in 
assessing damages. The owner claimed that it would have earned €7,558,375 had the 
charter been performed for the two years. Shortly after the repudiation the New Flamenco 
was sold for $23,765,000. Less than a year later Lehman Brothers imploded and the 
market for ships collapsed. The arbitrator found that by November 2009 (the end date for 
the contract extension) the ship’s market value had fallen to $7,000,000. The question 
confronting the arbitrator, and the subsequent justices, was: How, if at all, should the fall 
in value of the ship be taken into account in determining damages?  The damages would 
be the change in the value of the charter at the time of the repudiation. The market value 
of the New Flamenco when it was sold in 2007 could provide some information 
regarding that value; its value in 2009 could provide none. 
 
                                                 
24
 British Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground Electric Railways Co of London 




The charterer argued in effect that by breaching it did the owner a favor; by 
causing him to sell before the Crash, the owner saved over $16 million. The arbitrator 
agreed. Because that saving was so much greater than the foregone earnings, he awarded 
nothing to the owner. In the High Court Popplewell rejected the arbitrator’s conclusion;
26
 
he in turn was reversed by the Court of Appeal.
27
 The case is now on appeal to the 
Supreme Court. 
I note at the outset that the record is inconsistent regarding whether the owner 
could have sold the ship had the charter remained in force. The arbitrator, according to 
Popplewell, seems to have held that had the charter remained in force, the first day the 
owner could have sold the ship was November 2009.
28
 Popplewell asserted that the ship 
could have been sold during the charter period: “Whilst the charter was on foot, the 
Owners might have sold the Vessel subject to charter, provided that they did so on terms 
which required the new owner to perform the charterparty so that they were not putting it 
out of their power to perform.”
29
 Longmore in the Court of Appeal concluded that the 
owner could have sold the ship, even if the charterer had not breached: “There was some 
difference between counsel on the question whether the Owners could in fact have sold 
the vessel for their own account during the currency of the charterparty. . . . The answer 
is that the Owners could in theory sell the vessel, always subject to the existing 




The arbitrator concluded that it would not have been possible for the owner to 
find an alternative two-year charter and that the sale of the ship was caused by the breach. 
Therefore, “where the Owners acted in reasonable mitigation of damages caused by a 
breach of a time charterparty by selling the vessel, there was no reason why capital 
savings could not and should not be brought into account in considering the net loss 
suffered by the Owners.”
31
 There are five pieces to this argument: (a) mitigation, and in 
particular, British Westinghouse, is the proper framework for analysis; (b) an alternative 
two-year charter was not available; (c) selling the vessel was reasonable mitigation; (d) 
the breach caused the sale; and (e) the sale saved the Owner from incurring a capital loss. 
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Both the High Court and Court of Appeal accepted the first three propositions, but they 
disagreed on the others.  
Regarding the availability of a substitute, both decisions took as a starting point 
The Elena D’Amico
32
 which held that where there is an “available market” the damage 
measure would be the difference between the market rate and the charter rate. If there 
were an available market and the owner chose not to recharter, liability would still be 
based on the market rate. A failure to do so would not constitute a failure to mitigate 
since the losses would be the result of an independent decision not to recharter. The Court 
of Appeal accepted this: “An important question in this area of the law is whether there is 
an available market. . . .A decision to speculate on the market rather than buying in (or 
selling) at the date of the breach did not ‘arise’ from the contract but from the innocent 
party’s decision not to avail himself of the available market.”
33
 
So far, so good. But what if, as the arbitrator concluded, there were not an 
“available market”? This is where the mitigation language gets in the way. All the parties 
accepted the “compensatory principle”—the purpose of the remedy is to compensate the 
owner. The question should be not how did the owner mitigate, but what did the owner 
lose. The owner’s loss was the change in the value of the contract at the time of the 
breach.
34
 If an identical charter were available, that is, if there were an available market, 
that would provide the answer. If that substitute charter were not available, then 
ascertaining the change in the value of the asset (the charter) becomes more difficult. All 
the parties agreed that, given the state of the market, the owner’s response to the breach, 
selling the ship, was reasonable, and that the price it received was also reasonable.
35
 They 
disagreed on what to make of this.  
 
Popplewell argued that the sale mitigated the damages—the extra costs that it 
would have incurred from operating the ship. “The sale of the Vessel mitigated this loss 
because it reduced the continuing costs of operating or laying up the Vessel. To the extent 
that the benefits flowing from the sale comprised such cost savings, there is no difficulty 
in treating the causal nexus between breach and benefit as established through the 
mitigating step of selling the Vessel.”
36
 The subsequent decline in the value of the ship, 
he held, was irrelevant. It was caused by the financial crisis, not by the breach. The 
decision to realize the capital value of the asset in 2007 was independent of the breach.
37
 
Longmore, for the Court of Appeals, on the other hand, argued that if the owner did trade 
the vessel  
he may make additional losses or additional profits, but, in either event, 
they should be taken into account. He is not speculating on the market as 
he would be if there was an available market of which he chooses not to 
                                                 
32
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33
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34
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35
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36
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37
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avail himself; he is just bringing into account the consequences of his 
decision to mitigate his loss and those consequences will “arise”, generally 
speaking, from the consequences of the breach of contract.
38
 
So, if the owner “speculated” when there was an available market (a perfect, or near 
perfect substitute charter), by not immediately accepting the new deal, that speculation 
risk was on him. Damages would be calculated as if he had taken the deal. But if only an 
imperfect substitute—in this case, sale of the vessel—were available, the owner would 
not be speculating. Implicitly, it would be the charterer who would be speculating, 
bearing the risk of subsequent capital gains or losses. The charterer’s counsel did, in fact, 
concede that if the value of the vessel had gone up, the damages would have been greater: 
“Mr Croall accepted that, if the sale market had risen substantially during that time, the 
Charterers would be liable for the Owners’ inability to take advantage of that rise in the 
market, if the sale had arisen from the consequences of the breach of contract and been 
undertaken by way of mitigating the loss caused by that breach.”
39
 This was, of course, a 
costless concession. 
 
Longmore concluded that the results for the available market did not hold if no 
such market were available: 
[T]he prima facie measure of loss in hire contracts is the difference 
between the contractual hire and the cost of earning that hire (crew wages, 
cost of fuel etc).  But it will not usually be reasonable for the shipowner to 
claim that prima facie measure if he is able to mitigate that loss by trading 
his vessel if opportunities to trade that vessel arise.  If he does so trade the 
vessel, he may make additional losses or additional profits but, in either 
event, they should be taken into account.
40
   
What did the owner lose when the charterer breached? Popplewell had it about 
right when he noted that the loss was the difference between the value of the vessel with 
and without the charter: 
 
The Owners’ contractual rights under the charterparty were rights to an 
income stream, to which were attached the obligation to provide the 
Charterers with the use of the Vessel. So far as concerns the capital value 
of the Vessel, the only potentially beneficial change in the Owners’ 
position caused by loss of those contractual rights and concomitant 
obligations might be a difference in value between a vessel which is 
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 Fulton Shipping [2014] EWHC 1547 (Comm) [72]. I say “about right” because he followed this up with 
“the relevant benefit . . . would be the difference in value between the Vessel being sold in October 2007 
for immediate delivery, and the Vessel being sold in October 2007 for delivery at the expiry of the charter 
in November 2009.” As I show in the text, the 2009 date would be irrelevant. 
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The value of the vessel charter-free on the day of the breach was known—the sale 
price of $23,750,000. Expert testimony might provide a plausible estimate of the value on 
that date with the charter in place. Why might the vessel have been worth more with the 
charter in place? There were potentially three sources of additional value. First, the 
charter price might have been favorable. Since it appears that no time elapsed between 
the formation of the contract and its repudiation, it is unlikely that this would matter. 
Nothing in the opinions suggested that there had been a deterioration in the charter 
market at that time. Second, without the charter the owner would have been responsible 
for operating costs. Recall that Popplewell treated the sale of the vessel as mitigation of 
those costs. Since the buyer would have to take those costs into account, the sale price 
should have reflected this. Third, without the charter there would be a period during 
which the vessel would have been idle and the owner would receive no revenue. The 
longer that period was expected to last, the greater the discount that the buyer would have 
required.  
 
Conceptually, the purchase price could be broken down into two pieces—the first 
two years (the charter period) and the rest of the vessel’s expected life.
42
 If the buyer 
expected to immediately replace the charter at the current market rate (perhaps because 
the new owner planned on using the vessel immediately itself) then the price would 
reflect that. That piece would have been valuable to the buyer and that value would have 
been captured in the sale price. The value of the vessel would have been about the same 
with and without the charter and damages would have been close to zero. At the other 
extreme, if the new owner had anticipated that the ship would remain idle for the full two 
years, it would have paid nothing for the first piece. If the arbitrator’s measure were 
correct, that would imply that the vessel with the charter in place would have been worth 
over $30 million. The relevant question then becomes what would be the expected period 
of time the vessel would remain idle. Expectations regarding the idle period would be 
reflected in the discounted sale price. The actual sale price would be relevant if one could 
estimate the pre-breach market value of the vessel. The difference would be, as 
Popplewell noted, the measure of the owner’s damages. 
 
To label the sale as mitigation misses the point. The sale did not affect the 
damages; it only made it easier to conceptualize them. The loss was the charter rate less 
the operating costs per day for the period that the vessel was expected to remain idle. The 
sale meant that the task of finding a new user was shifted to the new owner and the sale 
price reflected the expectations regarding how long the vessel would remain idle. The 
arbitrator found that had the vessel remained idle for the entire two years, the damages 
would have been €7,558,375.
43
  Multiplying that number by the fraction of time that the 
vessel was expected to remain idle would provide a good approximation of the owner’s 
damages. What happened to the vessel after the owner sold the vessel—whether the 
shipping market changed, the ship sank, or it was resold—would be irrelevant. 
                                                 
42
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43
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The existence of an “available market” had nothing to do with determining 
damages. That would have provided the market price for determining the contract market 
differential. But, since there was no reason to believe that the market price had changed, 
damages on that score would have been zero. The owner’s loss depended not on the price 
change but on the expected cost of the ship remaining idle for some period of time. The 
“available market” concept would have been unhelpful in determining that. 
 
III. Concluding Remarks 
 
Neither the purchase of the Parsons turbines nor the sale of the New Flamenco 
could sensibly be characterized as mitigating the damages suffered by the claimants. The 
former was simply the routine replacement of machines that would have been obsolescent 
had the contractual specifications been met; even if the claimant had accelerated the 
replacement, the mitigation offset would have been only a small fraction of the purchase 
price (and it would almost certainly have been a mistake to compensate for that). Once 
the nature of technical change in the turbine business and the distinction between the 
physical life and the economic life of the machines is recognized, the irrelevance of 
mitigation becomes clear.  
 
At least in the context of British Westinghouse framing the case as involving 
mitigation did not do any direct harm—Viscount Haldane came to the right result. That 
has not been the case with The New Flamenco. The misapplication of the mitigation 
doctrine and the “available market” concept led the arbitrator and the Court of Appeal 
astray. The breach meant that the vessel would remain idle for at least some portion of 
the two years remaining on the charter. The damages would be for the expected period of 
idleness and that would be reflected in the post-repudiation change in value of the New 
Flamenco. The post-recession change in value, which the arbitrator and Court of Appeal 
focused on, had nothing to do with the loss the owner suffered at the time of the 
repudiation. 
 
 
